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Add support for keyword commands.
Signed-off-by: Christian Franke <chris@opensourcerouting.org>
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Signed-off-by: Christian Franke <chris@opensourcerouting.org>
Signed-off-by: David Lamparter <equinox@opensourcerouting.org>
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Use the array_size() helper macro. Replaces several instances of local
macros with the same definition.
Reviewed-by: Scott Feldman <sfeldma@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David Lamparter <equinox@opensourcerouting.org>
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OVERVIEW
The checksum used in OSPF (rfc2328) is specified in rc905 annex B. There is an
sample implementation in rfc1008 which forms the basis of the quagga
implementation. This algorithm works perfectly when generating a checksum;
however, validation is a bit problematic.
The following LSA (generated by a non-quagga implementation) is received by
quagga and marked with an invalid checksum; however, it passes both the rfc905
and rfc1008 validation checks.
static uint8_t lsa_10_121_233_29[] = {
0x0e, 0x10, 0x02, 0x03,
0x09, 0x00, 0x35, 0x40,
0x0a, 0x79, 0xe9, 0x1d,
0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x03,
0x00, 0x8a, 0x00, 0x1c,
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xe0,
0x00, 0x00, 0x36, 0xb0
};
LS Type: Summary-LSA (IP network)
LS Age: 3600 seconds
Do Not Age: False
Options: 0x02 (E)
Link-State Advertisement Type: Summary-LSA (IP network) (3)
Link State ID: 9.0.53.64
Advertising Router: 10.121.233.29 (10.121.233.29)
LS Sequence Number: 0x80000003
LS Checksum: 0x008a
Length: 28
Netmask: 255.255.255.224
Metric: 14000
You'll note that one byte of the checksum is 0x00; quagga would calculate the
checksum as 0xff8a.
It can be argued that the sourcing implementation generates an incorrect
checksum; however, rfc905 indicates that, for 1's complement arithmetic, the
value 255 shall be regarded as 0, thus either values are valid.
EXPLANATION
The quagga ospfd and ospf6d implementations operate by copying the PDU's
existing checksum in a holding variable, calculating the checksum, and comparing
the resulting checksum to the original. As a note, this implementation has the
side effect of modifying the contents of the PDU.
Evaluation of both rfc905 and rfc1008 shows that checksum validation should
involve calculating the sum over the PDU and checking that both resulting C0 and
C1 values are zero. This behavior is enacted in the rfc1008 implementation by
calling encodecc with k = 0 (checksum offset); however, this functionality had
been omitted from the quagga implementation.
PATCH
This patch adds the ability to call the quagga's fletcher_checksum() with a
checksum offset value of 0xffff (aka FLETCHER_CHECKSUM_VALIDATE) which returns
the sum over the buffer (a value of 0 indicates a valid checksum). This is
similar to the mechanism in rfc1008 when called with k = 0. The patch also
introduces ospf_lsa_checksum_valid().
ospf6d had it's own implementation of the fletcher checksum in
ospf6_lsa_checksum(); it's the same algorithm as in fletcher_checksum(). This
patch removes the local implementation in favor of the library's as well as creates
and uses ospf6_lsa_checksum_valid().
quagga's ISIS implementation suffers from the same problem; however, I do not
have the facilities to validate a fix to ISIS, thus this change has been left to
the ISIS maintainers. The function iso_csum_verify() should be reduced to
running the fletcher checksum over the buffer using an offset of 0.
Signed-off-by: JR Rivers <jrrivers@cumulusnetworks.com>
Reviewed-by: Scott Feldman <sfeldma@cumulusnetworks.com>
Reviewed-by: Nolan Leake <nolan@cumulusnetworks.com>
Reviewed-by: Ayan Banerjee <ayan@cumulusnetworks.com>
Reviewed-by: Shrijeet Mukherjee <shm@cumulusnetworks.com>
Signed-off-by: David Lamparter <equinox@opensourcerouting.org>
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Only implement ospfv3NbrStateChange and ospfv3IfStateChange.
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This includes:
- ospfv3AsLsdbTable
- ospfv3AreaLsdbTable
- ospfv3LinkLsdbTable
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Use the real MIB from RFC 5643. Fix used ASN1 types. Indexes are not
exported any more (they are "no access"). Fix some endian
issues. Also, ID are just integers, not IPv4 addresses.
No additional OID are supported in this commit.
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Most table handlers do not expect to be given an OID whose prefix is
outside what they can handle. This is not a problem with the SMUX
implementation since it always correct the OID such that the prefix
matches. However, this is not the case for the AgentX
implementation. A new function, smux_header_table() is used to do this
normalization.
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The correct method to link to NetSNMP is to use net-snmp-config (which
is like pkg-config). Explicit link to libcrypto is also dropped
(NetSNMP libs are linked to libcrypto, no need to link Quagga to
it). Moreover, @SNMP_INCLUDES@ is dropped because useless. Due to a
bug in configure.ac, it was properly populated.
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NetSNMP is the only SNMP implementation for Quagga. We don't need two
different symbols.
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Some .h files in lib/ are autogenerated. The search path should
include the build directory and the source directory. They usually
match but sometimes, they may be different. For example:
$ mkdir build
$ cd build
$ ../configure
$ make
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ospf6_prefix_apply_mask would write one byte beyond the 4/8/12
bytes allocated for prefixes of length 32/64/96.
based on report and patch by Jon Andersson <jon.andersson@thales.no>
Reported-by: Jon Andersson <jon.andersson@thales.no>
Signed-off-by: David Lamparter <equinox@diac24.net>
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The previous commits modified both zebra and bgpd for additional
SAFI field, but not any other routing daemon, which led to zebra
daemon crashing with failed assertion.
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* fix disagreement with C99 in zlog_debug calls
Format specifier in some zlog_debug calls for size_t values
was changed in order to C99 ('%u' -> '%zu').
* fix -Wsign-compare warnings
Type of return value of ospf6_packet_max() was changed.
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This is needed to avoid stale routes in some cases; the regression was
introduced by commit 1d19234e79c77a7d55194b513f2a77c6a691bc2c.
* ospf6_spf.c: (ospf6_spf_calculation) Call ospf6_spf_table_finish()
before possibly returning if no router-LSA is found for the root of
the SPF tree.
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* ospf6_message.h
* OSPF6_MESSAGE_TYPE_CANONICAL(): dismiss
* OSPF6_MESSAGE_TYPE_NAME(): dismiss
* ospf6_message.c
* ospf6_message_type_str: rewrite as a message list, add max value
* ospf6_packet_examin(): update to use LOOKUP()
* ospf6_receive(): idem
* ospf6_send(): idem
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As long as ospf6_packet_examin() is now the single checkpoint for
received packets, most of the old checks performed elsewhere can
be converted into assert() constructs. Malformed input data at
respective points can be attributed solely to a programming error,
not a malformed packet.
* ospf6_message.c
* ospf6_hello_print()
* ospf6_dbdesc_print()
* ospf6_lsreq_print()
* ospf6_lsupdate_print()
* ospf6_lsack_print()
* ospf6_hello_recv()
* ospf6_dbdesc_recv_master()
* ospf6_dbdesc_recv_slave()
* ospf6_lsreq_recv()
* ospf6_lsupdate_recv()
* ospf6_lsupdate_recv()
* ospf6_lsack_recv()
* ospf6_receive()
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this replaces most occurences of routing protocol lists by preprocessor
defines from route_types.h. the latter is autogenerated from
route_types.txt by a perl script (previously awk). adding a routing
protocol now is mostly a matter of changing route_types.txt and log.c.
Conflicts:
lib/route_types.awk
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All daemons modified to support custom path to zserv
socket.
lib: generalize a zclient connection
zclient_socket_connect added. zclient_socket and
zclient_socket_un were hidden under static expression.
"zclient_serv_path_set" modified.
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* ospf6_network.[ch]
* ospf6_sso(): new function supersedes ospf6_join_allspfrouters(),
ospf6_leave_allspfrouters(), ospf6_join_alldrouters() and
ospf6_leave_alldrouters()
* ospf6_interface.c
* ospf6_interface_state_change(): update respectively
* interface_up(): ditto
* interface_down(): ditto
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ospf6_routemap_rule_match_interface* was imported from ospfd
daemon with minor changes. new CLI options defined.
`ospf6_routemap_rule_match_interface' was changed to support
IPv6 (ospfv3) route's external information.
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ospf6 main always calls ospf6_exit() which always calls exit.
Use attributes to tell GCC that this is ok.
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* ospf6_message.c: (ospf6_packet_max): new function, return maximum IPv6
payload on an interface; (ospf6_hello_send, ospf6_dbdesc_send,
ospf6_dbdesc_send_newone, ospf6_lsreq_send, ospf6_lsupdate_send_neighbor,
ospf6_lsupdate_send_interface, ospf6_lsack_send_neighbor,
ospf6_lsack_send_interface): compare message size with the maximum
payload instead of the MTU.
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IPv6 supports the same concept of differentiated service for routing
protocols as IPv4, but like too many things, the standards committee
decided that having two names for the same thing wasn't good enough and
introduced a third more generic term transport class.
The socket option to set transport class works the same as IPv4, but the
arguments are different.
* lib/sockopt.[ch]
* setsockopt_ipv6_tclass(): new function
* bgpd/bgp_network.c
* bgp_connect(): set socket option
* bgp_listener(): set socket option
* ospf6d/ospf6_network.c
* ospf6_set_transport_class(): new function
* ospf6_serv_sock(): set socket option
* ripngd/ripngd.c
* ripng_make_socket(): set socket option
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* ospf6_main.c: include required headers
* ospf6_asbr.h: idem
* ospf6_spf.c
* ospf6_spf_install(): remove unused variables
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* ospf6_area.c
* ospf6_area_config_write(): write filter-list, import-list and
export-list lines
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This essentially merges the fix available from Debian build of Quagga.
* ospf6_area.c
* area_filter_list(): use correct argv indices
* no_area_filter_list(): idem
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This vulnerability (CERT-FI #514840) was reported by CROSS project.
ospf6d processes IPv6 prefix structures in incoming packets without
verifying that the declared prefix length is valid. This leads to a
crash
caused by out of bounds memory access.
* ospf6_abr.h: new macros for size/alignment validation
* ospf6_asbr.h: idem
* ospf6_intra.h: idem
* ospf6_lsa.h: idem
* ospf6_message.h: idem
* ospf6_proto.h: idem
* ospf6_message.c
* ospf6_packet_minlen: helper array for ospf6_packet_examin()
* ospf6_lsa_minlen: helper array for ospf6_lsa_examin()
* ospf6_hello_recv(): do not call ospf6_header_examin(), let upper
layer verify the input data
* ospf6_dbdesc_recv(): idem
* ospf6_lsreq_recv(): idem
* ospf6_lsupdate_recv(): idem
* ospf6_lsack_recv(): idem
* ospf6_prefixes_examin(): new function, implements A.4.1
* ospf6_lsa_examin(): new function, implements A.4
* ospf6_lsaseq_examin(): new function, an interface to above
* ospf6_packet_examin(): new function, implements A.3
* ospf6_rxpacket_examin(): new function, replaces
ospf6_header_examin()
* ospf6_header_examin(): sayonara
* ospf6_receive(): perform passive interface check earliest possible,
employ ospf6_rxpacket_examin()
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This vulnerability (CERT-FI #514839) was reported by CROSS project.
When Database Description LSA header list contains trailing zero octets,
ospf6d tries to process this data as an LSA header. This triggers an
assertion in the code and ospf6d shuts down.
* ospf6_lsa.c
* ospf6_lsa_is_changed(): handle header-only argument(s)
appropriately, do not treat LSA length underrun as a fatal error.
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Two extern declarations in ospf6_abr.h are based on struct ospf6_route,
which may not be available at the time ospf6_abr.h is included. This may
lead to warnings after including ospf6_abr.h just for the structures
defined in it.
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* ospf6_abr.c
* ospf6_abr_examin_summary(): only fill "buf" when it is used
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"mtu-ignore" is an option ospfd used to mimic from the vendor's
implementation, now ospf6d will also implement it.
* ospf6_interface.h: extend ospf6_interface structure by one flag
* ospf6_interface.c: (ipv6_ospf6_mtu_ignore, no_ipv6_ospf6_mtu_ignore):
new declarations; (ospf6_interface_create): show initial value for
consistency; (ospf6_interface_show): print flag status
* ospf6_message.c: (ospf6_dbdesc_recv): consider interface-specific flag
when checking MTU
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* ospf6_zebra.c: (ospf6_zebra_if_state_update) zebra_interface_state_read
may return NULL, if it can't find an interface, deal with it.
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* ospf6_route.c ([no_]debug_ospf6_route) Include memory as a debug
option. This allows ospf6 route memory debugging to be enabled or
disabled interactively or from a config file.
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* ospf6_route.c: (ospf6_route_best_next) Allows unlock route, even
when there's no next route. This is consistent with how
ospf6_route_next() behaves.
* ospf6_intra.c: (ospf6_intra_prefix_lsa_remove) Make sure the last
route considered is always unlocked. This is needed when the for
loop terminates because ospf6_route_is_prefix() returns zero.
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A clean exit makes it easier to use memory debuggers.
* ospf6_asbr.c: (ospf6_asbr_terminate) Add a function to do route map
cleanup.
* ospf6_lsa.c: (ospf6_lsa_terminate) Add a function to cleanup the lsa
handler vector.
* ospf6_main.c: (ospf6_exit) Add an function that causes ospf6d to
gracefully exit.
* ospf6_message.c: (ospf6_message_terminate) Add a function that frees
the send and receive buffers.
* ospf6_top.c: (ospf6_delete) Enable the ospf6_delete() function.
Disable ospf6 before freeing everything.
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* ospf6_area.c: (ospf6_area_delete) Get rid of unused code that refers
to a nonexistent function and structure member.
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* ospf6_area.c: Call ospf6_spf_table_finish() before deleting the spf
table. This ensures that the associated ospf6_vertex structures
are also freed.
* ospf6_spf.c: Only allocate a priority queue when a spf calculation
is actually performed. Also defer calling ospf6_spf_table_finish().
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