diff options
| author | Denis Ovsienko <infrastation@yandex.ru> | 2012-02-28 15:15:29 +0400 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | David Lamparter <equinox@diac24.net> | 2012-03-12 11:05:45 +0100 |
| commit | aee567450eaf32877d00f47c4cc5d05c5fb85a51 (patch) | |
| tree | 9fb0df5ce6fedc3e403f8b2b4d59ed0e556a1453 /ospfd | |
| parent | bd5651f0ec7aa94627a2a6868dd458f016750a35 (diff) | |
ospfd: reduce ospf_verify_header()
Protocol version checks fits ospf_packet_examin() better (like it is
implemented in ospf6d), and packet type check is already there.
Diffstat (limited to 'ospfd')
| -rw-r--r-- | ospfd/ospf_packet.c | 21 |
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 15 deletions
diff --git a/ospfd/ospf_packet.c b/ospfd/ospf_packet.c index 4842c4e2..351fb210 100644 --- a/ospfd/ospf_packet.c +++ b/ospfd/ospf_packet.c @@ -2587,6 +2587,12 @@ ospf_packet_examin (struct ospf_header * oh, const unsigned bytesonwire) /* Now it is safe to access header fields. Performing length check, allow * for possible extra bytes of crypto auth/padding, which are not counted * in the OSPF header "length" field. */ + if (oh->version != OSPF_VERSION) + { + if (IS_DEBUG_OSPF_PACKET (0, RECV)) + zlog_debug ("%s: invalid (%u) protocol version", __func__, oh->version); + return MSG_NG; + } bytesdeclared = ntohs (oh->length); if (ntohs (oh->auth_type) != OSPF_AUTH_CRYPTOGRAPHIC) bytesauth = 0; @@ -2682,21 +2688,6 @@ static int ospf_verify_header (struct stream *ibuf, struct ospf_interface *oi, struct ip *iph, struct ospf_header *ospfh) { - /* check version. */ - if (ospfh->version != OSPF_VERSION) - { - zlog_warn ("interface %s: ospf_read version number mismatch.", - IF_NAME (oi)); - return -1; - } - - /* Valid OSPFv2 packet types are 1 through 5 inclusive. */ - if (ospfh->type < 1 || ospfh->type > 5) - { - zlog_warn ("interface %s: invalid packet type %u", IF_NAME (oi), ospfh->type); - return -1; - } - /* Check Area ID. */ if (!ospf_check_area_id (oi, ospfh)) { |