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authorDenis Ovsienko <infrastation@yandex.ru>2012-04-19 20:34:13 +0400
committerDavid Lamparter <equinox@opensourcerouting.org>2012-11-01 23:07:15 -0700
commitfe9bb6459afe0d55e56619cdc5061d8407cd1f15 (patch)
tree0de65deb7260c93592625348219f8933efbc1d04 /ospfd
parentd1d3ac9bad0caf7a9c465bb382b924009f0d9168 (diff)
bgpd: CVE-2012-1820, DoS in bgp_capability_orf()
An ORF (code 3) capability TLV is defined to contain exactly one AFI/SAFI block. Function bgp_capability_orf(), which parses ORF capability TLV, uses do-while cycle to call its helper function bgp_capability_orf_entry(), which actually processes the AFI/SAFI data block. The call is made at least once and repeated as long as the input buffer has enough data for the next call. The helper function, bgp_capability_orf_entry(), uses "Number of ORFs" field of the provided AFI/SAFI block to verify, if it fits the input buffer. However, the check is made based on the total length of the ORF TLV regardless of the data already consumed by the previous helper function call(s). This way, the check condition is only valid for the first AFI/SAFI block inside an ORF capability TLV. For the subsequent calls of the helper function, if any are made, the check condition may erroneously tell, that the current "Number of ORFs" field fits the buffer boundary, where in fact it does not. This makes it possible to trigger an assertion by feeding an OPEN message with a specially-crafted malformed ORF capability TLV. This commit fixes the vulnerability by making the implementation follow the spec.
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